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ANALYSIS OF EXPEDITED DEFENSE CONTRACTING 







The future of national security rests on more than nuclear weapons, heavy 
equipment, and conventional forces. Increasingly, security depends on technological 
advantage, innovation, and asymmetric technology exploitation. Future conflicts will 
share limited semblance to historical conflicts due to the technology exploitation that 
characterizes modern warfare. As the U.S. government’s share of research and 
development (R&D) funding shrinks and defense budgets continue to decline, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) will increasingly depend on new innovative firms to 
maintain a technological advantage. Such firms inherently differ from traditional defense 
acquisition in process and culture. They also enjoy demand from broader domestic and 
international markets. R&D funding sources affect rights to intellectual property—a 
major concern for technology firms. The DOD has authority for applying non-traditional 
contracting methods to better adapt to this competitive marketplace. This project studied 
non-traditional contracting tools at the DOD’s disposal and their merits, with an analysis 
of how the DOD can effectively leverage its existing and potential authorities to be a 
competitive buyer in the emerging technology market. Practitioners in the field provided 
first-hand accounts of their awareness and experience with non-traditional contracting. 
Findings include the benefits and limitations of non-traditional methods with 
recommendations for their selective application.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, much progress has been made to help Federal agencies 
gain greater access to the innovation and synergies generated by the 
commercial marketplace. Despite this progress, the standard procurement 
processes that agencies rely on to meet most of their needs may remain 
highly complex and enigmatic for companies that are not traditional 
government contractors. (White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy [OSTP], 2014, p. 2) 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) enjoys a degree of success in expedited 
procurement via the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM). Similar to those organizations, the Defense Innovation 
Unit Experimental (DIUx) model relies on expedited contracting methods to partner with 
non-traditional suppliers. The success of the DIUx venture rests on, among other things, 
contracting flexibility and full utilization of expedited procurement methods. Any 
shortcomings in this combination may significantly inhibit defense procurement of 
emerging technology. Unlike generic commercial-off-the-shelf items, emerging 
technology has no substitutes. And unlike non-commercial defense-specific items, 
emerging technology enjoys high demand from private industry buyers—the DOD’s 
competition in technology acquisition. In this niche sector of emerging technology, the 
DOD does not have the luxury of employing a traditional, slow, tedious, and burdensome 
procurement process compared to the private sector that translates into price and schedule 
growth. In the area of emerging technology, the Department simply risks losing 
opportunities to procure emerging technology altogether. That jeopardizes the 
Department’s ability to maintain competitive military technological advantage for the 
national defense strategy. 
With shrinking post-wartime budgets and the shadow of long-term spending 
decline hanging over the DOD, the government will need to fully leverage all technology 
development sources to capture the most innovative and affordable solutions. Growing 
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technology companies not traditionally involved in defense sales offer promising 
opportunities for innovative products with defense application. According to OSTP 
(2014), “many of these companies can offer Federal agencies valuable new ways of 
solving long-standing problems and cost-effective alternatives for meeting everyday 
needs” (p. 2). 
In 2015, Secretary Carter announced the formation of DIUx with a mission to 
serve as a bridge between U.S. military and companies operating at the cutting edge of 
technology (“Work with Us,” n.d.). The future of national defense and military 
superiority rests on technological advantage over adversaries. The DOD relies on several 
types of sources in technology and engineering development. They include internal 
government laboratories, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), 
academic research institutions, traditional defense contractors, and non-traditional 
suppliers of unique solutions in the areas of cybersecurity, robotics, artificial intelligence, 
and machine learning. Capturing technological advantage requires leveraging these 
diverse sources of innovation. This report analyzes the last, non-traditional component.   
The non-traditional component has the potential to achieve great leaps in 
innovation based on market incentives, particularly compared to the more measured 
progress found in government laboratories and traditional defense suppliers. To capture 
technology development opportunities in the commercial market for innovation, the 
Department will need to evolve into being and acting as a competitive customer to the 
emerging technology market sector—a sector that currently has limited experience with 
government procurement philosophy, has reservations in pursuing the government 
market, or has outright apprehension of government intent with regard to intellectual 
property. While the notion of acting competitively in the marketplace encompasses the 
overall acquisition effort, this report is focused on the available expedited contracting 
tools and the DOD’s knowledge, understanding, and application thereof. To close the gap 
in the Department’s competitiveness as a buyer of emerging technology, we attempt to 
identify barriers to efficient and effective technology acquisition from a contracting 
perspective. Possible causes that limit defense technology acquisition efforts may include 
the inadequate application of existing expedited contracting tools based on a lack of 
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knowledge, training, or awareness in the defense acquisition workforce. Additionally, 
contracting’s risk-averse culture and conventional thinking may also inhibit flexibility. 
Finally, the existing expedited methods may actually be inadequate even when applied to 
the fullest extent.  
Every four years, the DOD issues a review to update strategic defense posture and 
priorities. 
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) established innovation as a 
central line of effort in the national defense strategy of the United States. 
Asymmetric technological capabilities enabling the U.S. to maintain a 
decisive military advantage over its adversaries and peer competitors are 
steadily eroding. Globalization has contributed significantly to a 
renaissance in commercial innovation fueled by venture capital investment 
that far exceeds the research and development budget of the Department 
of Defense (DOD). As a result, the global technology ‘water line’ has 
risen faster than DOD’s ability to outpace it alone. More so, rogue nations 
and non-state actors have gained ready access to new technology leading 
to an advancement in their offensive capabilities. (DIUx, n.d., p. 1)  
Consequently, Secretary Carter launched the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, or 
DIUx, “to accelerate the development, procurement, and integration of commercially 
derived disruptive capabilities to maintain defense technological lead” (DIUx, n.d., p. 2). 
With the premise of technology advancement and application as an item of immediate 
importance, DIUx mission is to serve as a bridge between U.S. military and companies 
operating at the cutting edge of technology (“Work with Us,” n.d.).  
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this MBA project is to analyze currently available expedited 
procurement methods to quickly acquire emerging technologies from small businesses; 
compare the methods to those used by DARPA, SOCOM, and Rapid Procurement Cells; 
and determine barriers to the DOD’s ability to harness technology acquisitions from 
prospective non-traditional suppliers. We intend to develop recommendations for DIUx 
to enable expedited acquisition of emerging and innovative products from leading 
engineering communities like Silicon Valley. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In this research, we answer the following question: How should DIUx leverage 
expedited contracting methods to acquire emerging technological innovations? In 
answering this question, we highlight the strengths and weaknesses inherent in currently 
available expedited procurement methods that bolster or reduce the DOD’s ability to be a 
competitive customer in this fast-paced industry.   
D. RESEARCH BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This project analyzes currently authorized expedited procurement methods to 
assess the acquisition community’s level of awareness of and familiarity with non-
traditional procurement tools. We also seek to assess training programs for expedited 
procurement methods and the actual application of expedited methods in defense 
acquisition activities. We interviewed representatives from DOD contracting offices and 
considered vendors’ concerns with the DOD’s acquisition processes to make findings-
based recommendations. The recommendations may lead to improve training programs, 
adapt policies, and influence Better Buying Power guidance, DOD and Service 
instructions, acquisition regulations, and legislative actions.   
The report acknowledges broad acquisition matters such as program management 
and interaction between multi-functional partners in the acquisition processes and 
communities. While the overall acquisition effort involves processes with a series of 
steps, this report focuses on the procurement tools and their application. Changes to DOD 
5000 processes and systemic adjustments in the acquisition process are beyond the scope 
of this project. Incentivizing the established traditional defense industrial companies to 
become more inherently innovative is also beyond the scope of this analysis and can 
serve as a promising area for further research. 
The intent of this research is to determine the optimal utilization of the various 
contracting methods within the boundaries of the existing acquisition framework. Our 
review of contracting methods focuses on existing tools, their flexibility, and their merits. 
Other factors that limit acquisition flexibility—fiscal appropriations, statutory 
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requirements, regulatory guidance, and organizational culture—can compound and 
cumulatively complicate the challenges. 
We rely on operational feedback from acquisition professionals to gauge the 
effectiveness of non-traditional procurement tools and their adequacy in conducting 
emerging technology acquisitions. The interview sample is limited to several respondents 
from various DOD organizations. While we believe the respondents, their organizations, 
and their responses adequately reflect the overall rapid acquisition community, they still 
represent only a limited sample. 
With this project, we attempt to reconcile the gap between a shrinking technology 
development cycle and a widening acquisition timeline. Our expectation is that defense-
sensitive technology will continue to proliferate at accelerating speeds. We also believe 
that increase in research spending will enhance innovation. Lastly, even our most 
expedited procurement methods may still be too slow, too restrictive, or too burdensome 
for this fast-moving technology industry.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
Chapter I presented the background, problem statement, purpose statement, 
research questions, and benefits and limitations of our research. In Chapter II, we present 
a review of the literature pertaining to the traditional contracting process, the expedited 
contracting process, and current congressional and organizational initiatives in the 
expedited procurement arena. In Chapter III, we discuss our data collection method, 
which involved phone interviews with DOD contracting units that use expedited 
contracting processes on a daily basis. In Chapter IV, we analyze the results of the 
interviews and provide recommendations. Finally, in Chapter V, we summarize our 
results and recommend further areas for research on this topic. 
F. SUMMARY 
The U.S. has been maintaining decades of technological edge over conventional 
adversaries. As technology became cheaper and more accessible, the U.S. technological 
advantage still remains but with increasing vulnerabilities to exploitation. Developments 
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in emerging technology open new fronts in unconventional warfare, allowing previous 
strengths to become new vulnerabilities. Spending large amounts of money on 
technology no longer assures security, superiority, or advantage. In today’s complicated 
and dynamic environment, the DOD needs to take an offensive and defensive approach to 
innovation: capturing leading edge defense technology before adversaries and preventing 
adversaries’ access to the same. This is a daunting task because the DOD’s traditional 
acquisition processes are not fully compatible with the fast-paced nature of the emerging 
technology market. A growing flow of emerging technology comes from new and 
innovative firms without experience in government contracting and with no need or 
desire to adapt to the DOD’s traditional contracting process. This project studies the 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review examines the differences between how the government 
traditionally conducts acquisitions and how we can expedite the process to buy emerging 
technology. As the DOD extends itself into Silicon Valley, a major hurdle the DOD must 
overcome is how to attract non-traditional vendors1—a process that likely involves 
alleviating the risk-reducing methods and processes of the traditional contracting process. 
We begin with a review of the traditional contracting process, then we provide an 
overview of the expedited contracting process, and conclude with multiple government 
initiatives meant to provide a faster means of contracting for emerging technology.  
B. TRADITIONAL CONTRACTING PROCESS 
“The traditional contracting process involves all activities associated with 
identifying and justifying a [traditional] mission need, formulating an acquisition strategy 
to meet the need, and implementing the strategy by means of a contractual relationship 
with a vendor” (DOD, 2012, p. 311). This process consists of three phases: pre-
solicitation, solicitation, and source selection (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  The Acquisition Process. Source: DOD (2012). 
                                                 
1 The DOD’s OT Guide for Prototype Contracts defines a non-traditional defense contractor as a 
“business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date of the OT agreement, entered 
into or performed on (1) any contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the 
regulations implementing such section; or (2) any other contract in excess of $700,000 to carry out 
prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects for a Federal agency that is 
subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation” (Gansler, 2002, p. 7).  
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1. Requirements Definition 
The requirement definition step involves capturing all customer requirements, 
performing market research, and constructing a Statement of Work (SOW) or Statement 
of Objectives (SOO). The most vital part of this step is to properly and thoroughly 
understand what the customer needs. If the customer’s requirement is not fully 
identifiable, a SOO is used to seek vendor solutions to the requirement, and a vendor-
proposed SOW is incorporated into the contract. Market research is conducted to 
determine the number of capable vendors that can satisfy the agency’s requirement, to 
discover whether commercially available or non-developmental items can be used, and to 
determine the typical prices and practices of vendors engaged in producing the product or 
service (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] 10.001(a)(3), 2016). With the requirement 
well defined and market research conducted, the acquisition team can begin to construct 
their strategy.  
2. Acquisition Strategy 
Acquisition planning (or creating the strategy for the acquisition) is the “process 
by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and 
integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely 
manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall strategy for managing 
the acquisition” (FAR 2.101, 2016). Planning and market research are meant to promote 
the acquisition of commercial items, full and open competition, selection of the 
appropriate contract type, and appropriate consideration of pre-existing contracts prior to 
the award of any new contracts (FAR 7.102(a), 2016). When the plan is in place, the team 
can solicit the requirement. The contracting officer, in consultation with the rest of 
acquisition team, determines the appropriate contracting method and vehicle at this stage. 
Policy and regulations guide decisions toward traditional procurement approach, unless 
market conditions, required item or other external factors require the use of non-
traditional methods.  
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3. Request for Proposal 
A Request for Proposal (RFP) is a “formal negotiated solicitation issued for buys 
over $100,000 resulting in a formal contract [and] includes the contract form, contract 
clauses, work statements, specifications, delivery schedule, and payment terms” (DOD, 
2012, p. 314). If an RFP requires manufacturing, the solicitation could include production 
cost, quality systems, manufacturing development and demonstration, production, 
quality, and manufacturing efficiencies, producibility engineering, and finally, process 
control and capability (DOD, 2012, p. 314). With the exception of commercial item 
acquisitions and in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT), an RFP should 
allow at least 30 days for proposal responses from vendors (FAR 5.203(c), 2016). 
However, if a solicitation for commercial items is synopsized for less than 30 days and 
receives only one proposal, the contracting officer (CO) shall resolicit for at least another 
30 days (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [DFARS] 205.203 (S-70), 
2016). The ultimate goal of issuing an RFP is to receive vendors’ proposals to fulfill the 
customer’s needs. Once the proposals are received, the acquisition team evaluates them 
(source selection) to determine the winning vendor and issue a contract (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Contract Award Steps. Source: DOD (2012). 
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4. Evaluation Phase 
The evaluation phase focuses on how offerors proposals met the requirements in 
the solicitation. Evaluations may be conducted using various rating methods, such as 
color or adjectival ratings. Required evaluation factors include “price or cost and quality, 
using one or more non-cost factors such as past performance, compliance technical 
excellence, management capability, and personnel qualifications” (DOD, 2012, p. 315).   
Detailed lists of what the evaluation process includes are provided in RFP Section 
L, Instructions to Offerors; and the basis of how the evaluation is conducted is detailed in 
Section M, Evaluation Factors for Award. Best value is determined using either the 
lowest price, technically acceptable or the tradeoff method of evaluation (the details of 
the chosen method are provided in both Sections L and M of the RFP). “All factors and 
significant sub-factors that affect the contract award and their relative importance shall be 
clearly stated in the solicitation” (FAR 15.304(d), 2016).   
Evaluation of proposals is based on the criteria, factors, and priority as specified 
in the solicitation. If it is determined that negotiations are in order, the government must 
first establish a competitive range with only the highest rated proposals, and comply with 
the procedures of FAR 15.306 (2016).   
5. Contract Award 
The final step in the traditional contracting process is awarding the contract based 
on the completion of final evaluations, conclusion of negotiations (if applicable), and 
approval of the required clearance documentation. Upon completion of the evaluation 
process, the successful offeror is notified by the contracting officer through an executed 
contract award document (Standard Form [SF] 26, SF 33, SF 1449, or DOD Document 
[DD] 1155) (DOD, 2012, pp. 315–316). Additionally, a notice is sent to all unsuccessful 
offerors. Each notice contains the “number of offerors solicited; the number of proposals 
received; the name and address of each offeror receiving an award; items, quantities, and 
any stated unit prices of each award; and the reason(s) the offeror’s proposal was not 
accepted, unless the price information reveals the reason” (FAR 15.503(b)(1), 2016). 
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Finally, the contracting officer will publish a synopsis of the contract award on 
FedBizOpps as a final notice to all interested vendors.  
The traditional contracting path sets a structure for the workforce to follow. It 
values fairness, thoroughness, and consistency over speed or efficiency. It aligns with the 
government’s socio-economic and policy objectives. The administrative burdens 
accumulate for both the procuring organizations and offerors with negative effects on 
efficiency, competitiveness of the government as a buyer, and competition among 
vendors willing to meet government’s administrative requirements. Traditional methods 
attempt to mitigate procedural risks to the government. Acquisition process can go awry 
for a multitude of reasons from unethical behavior to poor contractor performance. 
Traditional methods provide a degree of oversight over acquisition workforce conduct 
and contractor performance. This oversight also enables procuring offices to better 
withstand outside scrutiny. But in following the traditional procurement policy in an 
effort to mitigate risk, the defense acquisition community largely disregards the 
accompanying costs of traditional acquisition methods. This compliance-centered 
approach offers little flexibility but provides a sense of process security and integrity to 
the acquisition community and oversight bodies.  
Expedited procurement methods, as the name suggests, offer greater speed and 
efficiency in attempting to meet acquisition objectives. In employing these alternate 
tools, the government frees itself from some of the administrative burdens and lowers the 
administrative threshold for vendors to pursue government markets. While expedited 
methods offer the potential to better capture competitive markets at a lower cost and 
tighter schedule, they also carry perceived or real risk growth in oversight, compliance, 
and performance. The spectrum of traditional to expedited methods involves a trade-off 
between compliance and speed. Speed also affects risk levels in the acquisition process 
and product performance. 
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C. EXPEDITED CONTRACTING PROCESS  
This section is divided into three areas: expedited solicitation methods, expedited 
contracting methods, and the agreements that are made using these two methods to buy 
emerging technology. 
1. Expedited Solicitation Methods 
Expedited solicitation methods allow flexibility with the schedule or breadth of 
requirements compared to the more rigid traditional solicitation method. Expedited 
solicitations can also remain open on a continuous basis in recognition that technology 
may not yet exist to satisfy the requirements or businesses may need to develop a 
technological solution rather than just a price proposal in response to non-traditional 
solicitation. When the requirements themselves are not defined, non-traditional 
solicitations allow the government to seek for a solution in very broad terms and offer 
vendors an opportunity at structuring the solution. 
a. Broad Agency Announcement 
According to FAR 35.016(a), “Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) may be 
used by agencies to fulfill their requirements for scientific study and experimentation 
directed toward advancing the state-of-the-art technology or increasing knowledge or 
understanding rather than focusing on a specific system or hardware solution” (2016). 
The BAA issues a set of needs (similar to the SOO) based on the agency’s future areas of 
interest. While the BAA solicitation method is not typically used for specific product 
acquisitions, it can be used to demonstrate a technological concept. Also similar to the 
traditional solicitation, the BAA expects offerors to propose their company’s solution to 
solve the need, but a lengthy full proposal is not required unless the government requests 
one.  
As with all DOD acquisitions, “proposals received as a result of the BAA shall be 
evaluated in accordance with evaluation criteria specified therein through a peer or 
scientific review process. Written evaluation reports on individual proposals will be 
necessary but proposals need not be evaluated against each other since they are not 
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submitted in accordance with a common work statement” (FAR 35.016(f), 2016). This 
peer or scientific review process is dramatically faster than the traditional evaluation 
process directed in FAR 15.3 and described in the previous section. For BAAs, “the 
primary basis for selecting proposals for acceptance shall be technical, importance to 
agency programs, and fund availability. Cost realism and reasonableness shall also be 
considered to the extent appropriate” (FAR 36.016(e), 2016). 
There are two types of BAAs used to achieve the government’s desired outcome; 
the “One-Step” method requires offerors to only submit proposed solutions, while the 
“Two-Step” method requires a white paper submission followed by a proposal if the 
submitter is chosen as a viable contender. A white paper is a brief summary of an 
offeror’s technical approach (with a rough-order-of-magnitude [ROM] price associated) 
that generally does not exceed two to three pages in length. Per the Air Force Research 
Laboratory’s (2015) Guide for Industry, “The objective of a BAA is to encourage 
participation by science and technology firms and educational institutions in meeting Air 
Force Research and Development goals for innovative ideas and approaches for research 
that is general in nature” (p. 4). 
An advantage to using the BAA solicitation method is the ability to award to 
multiple offerors. The BAA states the type of awards that can be made, the period of 
performance, and the anticipated dollar range for each award. According to FAR Part 6, 
“An award under the technique is treated as meeting the statutory requirement in the 
Competition in Contracting Act for full and open competition” (FAR 6.102(d)(2), 2016). 
There is no guarantee of a government contract resulting from the BAA process. 
b. Commercial Solutions Opening 
A Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) is very similar to a BAA in that it is an 
open-ended (typically five-year), two-step process for requesting solution briefs and 
proposals to solve government questions/problems. DIUx released its own CSO in mid-
2016 when it began working with the Army Contracting Command–New Jersey. The 
process begins with the CSO identifying the current capabilities of interest to the DOD. 
Next, Silicon Valley vendors submit their solution briefs to solve the identified 
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technological shortcomings. After they review solution briefs, DIUx contacts the vendor 
within 30 days if they are interested in the product. Some vendors may even be invited to 
pitch or demonstrate their product at DIUx. If the product or solution is determined a 
viable solution, the vendor is invited to provide a full proposal, including a statement of 
work and a cost proposal. Similar to a BAA, an RFP does not guarantee that a contract 
will be let or that funding is available to purchase the product. Finally, should a proposal 
be deemed viable and funds are available, the government may choose to make an award. 
Awards are fixed price and are made using Other Transaction (OT) Authority.   
Unlike the BAA, the CSO results in the award of prototype projects, which 
include not only commercially available technologies fueled by commercial or strategic 
investment, but also concept demonstrations, pilots, and agile development activities that 
can incrementally improve commercial technologies or concepts for defense application 
(DIUx, n.d., p. 2). Additionally, the following are a few of the many streamlined benefits 
of the CSO: minimal corporate and technical information is provided up front, the 
payment terms are negotiable, there is a 30-day response to solution briefs, intellectual 
property (IP) rights are negotiable (government does not plan to control IP), vendors 
receive direct feedback from DOD customers in the field, and there is potential for 
follow-on funding for promising technologies and sponsorship of user test cases for 
prototypes and possible follow-on production (DIUx, n.d., p. 2).  
2. Expedited Contracting Methods 
The following section details the current expedited contracting methods available 
to contracting offices. A detailed comparison of each method is included in Appendix A.  
a. Rapid Technology Prototyping 
Using a BAA to solicit,  
rapid prototyping … shall provide for the use of innovative technologies 
to rapidly develop fieldable prototypes to demonstrate new capabilities 
and meet emerging military needs. The objective of an acquisition 
program under this pathway shall be to field a prototype that can be 
demonstrated in an operational environment and provide for a residual 
 15 
operational capability within five years of the development of an approved 
requirement. (S. Rep. No. 114-49, 2015, p. 167)  
The rapid technology prototyping method consists of “multiple, small, fast, and 
cheap acquisitions to ‘try out’ innovative technologies. This method allows the 
government rapid testing of available cutting-edge, unproven, but potentially 
transformative technological advancements” (OSTP, 2014, p. 5). Success in development 
and adaptation of these emerging technologies typically ranges from 10%–30% of all 
submitted technologies based on substantial trial and error. Most prototyping projects are 
carried out at the vendor’s facility and can last anywhere from three to six months. 
Awards are made using firm fixed price contracts with an emphasis placed on non-
traditional vendor participation. The best use of this method is to test innovative solutions 
presented by non-traditional vendors. 
b. Staged Contracts 
Also using a BAA to solicit solutions, the staged contract method is used to “scale 
proven solutions and expedite the rapid and inexpensive assessment of many existing or 
prototyping private sector technologies ... using a three-phase evaluation process: short 
concept paper, invite-only full proposal, and a subsequent one-to-two-year pilot 
evaluation period” (OSTP, 2014, p. 7). The underlying advantage of this method is that it 
allows the government to test out emerging technologies prior to full commitment and/or 
transferring them to programs of record. The best use of this method is the ability to scale 
proven solutions by non-traditional vendors. 
c. Milestone-Based Competitions 
As noted in the Innovative Contracting Case Studies document, “A milestone-
based competition is an innovative contracting model that promotes competition among a 
stable pool of selected offerors across a series of clear, technically feasible milestones, 
with payment withheld until the associated, agreed-upon milestone is completed” (OSTP, 
2014, p. 9). This method is similar to the other methods because it uses the BAA to 
solicit; however, the idea of only competing among vetted vendors differentiates this 
method from prototyping methods. Furthermore, small businesses in the pool are granted 
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additional access to federal financial resources and private contributions to complete the 
task. The best use of this method is to fulfill an agency’s immediate technological need or 
the need to discover whether novel solutions exist by non-traditional vendors. 
d. Incentive Prizes 
Another method for discovering innovative solutions to government problems 
involves the use of incentive prizes. This method gets its authority from the America 
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 that permits agencies to “carry out a program 
to award prizes competitively to stimulate innovation that has the potential to advance the 
mission of the respective agency” (Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 
1980). Incentive prizes are used to attract non-traditional vendors and teams toward task 
completion knowing they only get paid for successful completion of the task. Incentives 
have been used by many government entities to advance R&D activities in health care, 
energy, education, and military operations. Finally, incentive prizes are not governed by 
the FAR, and thus are subject to fewer administrative burdens. The best use of this 
method is to fulfill an agency’s immediate technological needs or to discover whether 
non-traditional vendors have novel solutions to a problem. 
e. Challenge-Based Acquisitions 
When the government has an established requirement or need but is struggling 
with actual specifications, a challenge-based acquisition may be appropriate. This method 
is a great way to find solutions that may already exist in the market. The government 
benefits by only paying for the solution that meets the requirements of the challenge, and 
it can be quicker than other methods because it does not require the full development of a 
solution. For a project to be a candidate for this method, the following conditions must be 
met: (1) the ability to determine the user’s need and decomposition of complex 
requirements, (2) the ability to communicate user experiences and needs to industry, (3) 
the full design and execution of the challenge event, and (4) the ability to analyze the 
results and provide contract or task order awards (OSTP, 2014, p. 13). This method uses 
the BAA solicitation process and has been used successfully by many agencies. The best 
use of this method is to test innovative solutions presented by non-traditional vendors. 
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3. Agreements  
Agreements are contract vehicles used in securing a transaction between the 
government and the non-traditional vendor. These agreements are less structured than 
traditional contracts; however, basic requirements such as a vendor’s eligibility in the 
System for Award Management (SAM) and their ability to receive a government 
agreement or contract are still the same. This section details five types of agreements that 
can result from expedited contracting methods. 
a. Other Transactions Authority 
To afford certain procuring offices and non-traditional suppliers an avenue to 
bypass administrative acquisition burdens, the Congress-authorized prototype 
development outside the FAR. Early users of this special authority referred to this type of 
procurements as “other transactions.” 
Other Transactions Authority (OTA or OT) are agreements that allow an 
agency to enter into agreements “other than” standard government 
contracts or other traditional mechanisms. Agreements under this authority 
are generally not subject to federal laws and regulations applicable to 
federal contracts or financial assistance, allowing agencies to customize 
their other transaction agreements to help meet project requirements and 
mission needs. (GAO, 2016, p. 1) 
This authority is granted per 10 U.S.C. 2371 and Section 845 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Traditional contracting statutes that do not apply to 
OTAs include the Truth in Negotiations Act, Competition in Contracting Act, Contract 
Disputes Act, and even the Procurement Integrity Act. “OTA gives agencies the 
flexibility necessary to develop agreements tailored to a particular transaction” (Willsey, 
2016). This selective authority does have statutes of its own to follow, and in accordance 
with the “Other Transactions” Authority (OT) Guide for Prototype Projects, OTAs may 
only be used in the following conditions: 
1. There is at least one non-traditional defense contractor participating to a 
significant extent in the prototype project 
2. No non-traditional defense contractor is participating to a significant 
extent in the prototype project, but at least one of the following 
circumstances exists: 
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2a. At least one third of the total cost of the prototype project is 
to be paid out of funds provided by the parties to the transaction 
other than the federal Government. 
2b. The senior procurement executive for the agency 
determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify the use 
of a transaction that provides for innovative business arrangements 
or structures that would not be feasible or appropriate under a 
procurement contract. (Gansler, 2002, p. 8) 
In a report to Congress by L. Elaine Halchin (2011) of the Congressional 
Research Service, an OT is described as “a special vehicle used by federal agencies for 
obtaining or advancing [R&D] or prototypes” (p. 4). The report covers the origins of OTs 
and the congressional byproducts authorizing their use by various governmental 
departments. Recent legislation included in the fiscal year (FY) 2016 NDAA added 
provisions to increase small business and non-traditional offerors in the technology 
sector, as well as continuing the usage of the OTA for FY 2016. A recent DARPA 
presentation described OT advantages: 
Under certain circumstances, OTs may be used as the acquisition 
instrument to carry out prototype projects that are directly relevant to 
enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel and the 
supporting platforms, systems, components, or materials proposed to be 
acquired or developed by the DOD or improvements of platforms, 
systems, components, or materials in use by the armed forces. (Ulrey, 
2016, slide 9) 
Recognizing the need to reach the emerging technology base and acquire related 
technologies, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD [AT&L]) Frank Kendall (2015) emphasized the need for OTAs by directing the 
development of a handbook of methods and best practices to “develop recommendations 
to increase access to innovation within the national security environment through 
engaging non-traditional suppliers, entrepreneurs, and inventors” (Kendall, 2015, p. 16).  
b. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement  
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) provide 
federal laboratories with an extremely flexible vehicle to facilitate the 
transfer of commercially useful technologies from federal laboratories to 
the nonfederal sector. CRADAs support the broader purpose of providing 
 19 
the means for a federal laboratory to leverage its R&D efforts consistent 
with the laboratory’s mission. (Federal Laboratory Consortium, 2011, 
pp. 33–34) 
The laboratory director, in deciding what CRADA to use, gives special 
consideration to small or other disadvantaged businesses on an as needed basis. “The 
laboratory director also gives preference to business units located in the U.S. and to 
business units that agree that products or inventions made under the CRADA, or 
produced through the use of such inventions, will be manufactured substantially in the 
United States” (Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, 2011). 
c. Technology Investment Agreements 
Formerly known as Other Transactions for Research, a Technology Investment 
Agreement (TIA) is similar to a CRADA in that it “requires substantial federal 
involvement in the technical or management aspects of the project” (10 C.F.R. 
603.1340). This type of agreement is useful when an agency needs to stimulate research 
or has a need for research support. This initiative cannot duplicate other research 
conducted simultaneously with other programs, and government funds may not exceed 
the total amount provided in the cost share agreement (Ulrey, 2016, slide 8). 
d. Vendor Loan Agreements 
A vendor loan agreement (VLA, see Appendix B for an example) allows the 
government to evaluate supplier equipment in an operational environment for a specified 
period. The supplier provides the equipment at no cost to the government and bears all 
expenses for transportation, installation, removal, operational supplies, and repair parts. 
The supplier is also responsible for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of the 
equipment. The agreement does not obligate the government to purchase the item(s) in 
the future (DAU, 2011). Special Operations Command (SOCOM) contracting officers 
have used VLAs, and one contracting officer (KO) notes that “a government testing 
report is the payment in lieu of cash” (KO at SOCOM, personal communication, 
August 3, 2016).   
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e. Partnership Intermediary Agreements 
A partnership intermediary agreement (PIA) gains its authority from 15 U.S.C. 
3715, and is a “contract or memorandum of understanding with an intermediary that 
provides for the performance of services for a federal laboratory to increase cooperative 
or joint activities with small businesses, institutions of higher education or educational 
institutions” (Use of Partnership Intermediaries, 2015). SOCOM uses PIAs to 
collaborate, innovate, prototype, and explore with industry, labs, and other academic 
partners. For example, “the SOFWERX is a facility that allows SOCOM and their 
partners to conduct hands-on experiments to develop a solution and then come back with 
a white paper solution to the BAA” (KO at SOCOM, personal communication, 
August 3, 2016). 
D. CONGRESSIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES 
Beyond the processes detailed in Section C of this chapter, Congress has long 
recognized the need for speed to acquire emerging technology in the current market and 
has passed multiple initiatives as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA). The DOD has initiatives to “create stronger incentives for industry prime 
contractors and DOD program managers to ‘pull’ technology solutions from the DOD’s 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) investments, from non-traditional suppliers, and from entrepreneurs—and for 
inventors to ‘push’ innovative ideas to program offices and other acquisition 
organizations” (Kendall, 2015, p. 16). 
1. Small Business Innovation Research 
According to the Small Business Administration (SBA), the purpose of the SBIR 
program is to “stimulate technological innovation; use small businesses to meet Federal 
R&D needs; foster and encourage participation by socially and economically 
disadvantaged small businesses in technological innovation; and increase private sector 
commercialization of innovations ... thereby increasing competition, productivity and 
economic growth” (SBA, 2014a, p. 3). The focus of SBIR is to “ensure that the DOD 
makes it as easy as possible for small businesses with creative and innovative 
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technologies to work with the DOD and have their technologies included in the products 
that the DOD acquires” (Kendall, 2015, p. 16). Participation in SBIR program precludes 
companies from using outside venture capital funding for the same project. This 
exclusionary funding policy limits the opportunity to pool various funding sources for 
development of dual-use technology. 
2. Small Business Technology Transfer Research  
Congress established the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program in 
1992 in an effort to utilize industry and institutional problem solving techniques. “It is 
similar in structure to SBIR and funds cooperative research and development projects 
with small businesses in partnership with not-for-profit research institutions (such as 
universities) to move research into the marketplace” (DOD, 2015). The STTR program’s 
purpose is to “stimulate a partnership of ideas and technologies between innovative small 
business concerns (SBCs) and Research Institutions through Federally-funded R&D” 
(SBA, 2014b, p. 3). STTRs and SBIRs are small business enablers designed to go beyond 
basic research to create government and nongovernmental products. 
3. Rapid Innovation Program  
The Rapid Innovation Program (RIP), known as the Rapid Innovation Fund 
within the DOD, was originally established in the FY 2011 NDAA, and is “designed to 
fund innovative technologies, reduce life-cycle costs, address technical risks, improve 
timeliness of test and evaluation outcomes, and rapidly insert technologies needed to 
meet critical national security needs” (NDAA for FY 2016, 2015, p. 51). According to 
the Defense Innovation Marketplace website, some of the key requirements to utilizing 
the RIF include innovative technology stimulation, the reduction of acquisition and life 
cycle costs, improved timeliness and thoroughness of Test & Evaluation (T&E), 
technology transfer within 24 months of award, and a cost of less than $3 million (DOD, 
2016, slide 5). Of the 263 awards made in FY 2011 and FY 2012 under the RIP, over 
90% were made to small businesses, and a majority of those were leveraged from 
investments made under the SBIR program (NDAA for FY 2016, pp. 51–52). The RIP is 
designed to “deliver new technologies to acquisition programs and operational units that 
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may not otherwise be funded or evaluated given the fiscal constraints and traditional 
program management processes currently in place” (NDAA for FY 2016, p. 52). “The 
[RIP] process is somewhat lengthy (see Figure 3), taking about 18 months to implement 
and award contracts, but interest from contractors has been high” (GAO, 2015, p. 6). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Rapid Innovation Program Project Selection Process. 
Source: GAO (2015). 
E. SUMMARY 
The federal acquisition process is established in regulation that dictates how 
government acquisition professionals purchase services to supplies, but in a fast-paced 
and ever-changing technology environment, acquisition professionals must step outside 
of day-to-day practices and apply expedited contracting methods to procure emerging 
technology. If an organization is trying to scale a proven solution, the staged contract 
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method should be used. Likewise, if an organization is interested in testing innovative 
solutions, the challenge-based acquisition or the rapid technology prototyping methods 
are most appropriate. Use of the milestone-based contract or the incentive prize would 
best fulfill an agency’s need to discover novel solutions from non-traditional vendors. 
Should a solution or product be deemed viable to meet the needs of the government, an 
OTA or SBIR/STTR agreement can further expedite the process. These agreements are 
not governed by the FAR and provide a commercial-like means of buying products or 
allowing the government to try out prototypes for further application. 
  
 24 




This project explores contracting methods available for DIUx and other DOD 
organizations charged with quickly and efficiently procuring emerging technology 
solutions from innovative companies. The DOD enjoys a degree of success in expedited 
procurement with DARPA and SOCOM. Similar to those organizations, the DIUx model 
relies on expedited contracting methods to partner with non-traditional suppliers.   
Our research involves a combination of policy review, interviews, and previous 
technology procurement cases to investigate available acquisition processes across 
agencies and departments. Common responses may indicate persistent issues ripe for 
reform. Conflicting accounts may show how offices manage the acquisition environment 
differently with different outcomes. This collective feedback and analysis sheds light on 
the efficacy of differing practices and philosophies.  
Using interviews helps identify underlying differences between the intended 
acquisition path and actual processes. Discovering the actual process details requires 
personal interaction with stakeholders to glean delay-causing factors. The interviewees 
did not previously know the researchers and participated in the telephone interviews 
voluntarily.  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
We attended a DIUx small business town hall and a series of meetings with DIUx 
staff to learn their processes in accomplishing market outreach mission. We studied 
recent literature in the areas of rapid procurement, non-traditional contracting tools, and 
innovative technology acquisition. The operational feedback was based on interviews and 
written responses to our questions from defense acquisition professionals in various rapid 
acquisition offices.  
Protecting the identity of the interviewees permitted sincere and forthright 
feedback. Our research sample includes telephone interviews with five acquisition 
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professionals and written responses from three acquisition professionals. The respondents 
include civil service employees and military officers from different branches. The 
respondents are assigned to various commands, services, and defense agencies. Their 
acquisition experience levels vary from mid-level professionals and managers to senior 
contracting leaders. Their familiarity with non-traditional tools ranges from limited 
exposure to and awareness of the tools, to consistent use of the tools, to advocating policy 
and authorization for existing and future rapid procurement tools. We adapted interview 
questions from Senator Carper’s letter to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Director Donovan. Senator Carper, ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee, asked OMB Director Donovan about the 
acquisition process and the government’s ability to work around roadblocks “to better 
understand what OMB is doing to shepherd the use of innovative and emerging 
cybersecurity tools at Federal agencies” (Carper, 2016, p. 2). The interview questions are 
listed in Appendix C.   
C. SUMMARY 
This study relies on multiple sources to assess the DOD’s flexibility in procuring 
emerging technology. Acquisition statutes, regulations, and policies represent the 
currently available expedited procurement methods. Recent DOD history offers a number 
of acquisition cases in which the Department attempted to leverage the market to capture 
technology. Monitoring DIUx efforts provides a current view of reaching out to a 
promising technology market. Finally, interviewees provide experience-based feedback 






This research is focused on the DOD’s ability to competitively acquire innovative 
or disruptive technology with potential offensive or defense applications. Competitive in 
this instance refers not to the full and open competition in soliciting offers. To the 
contrary, it refers to the government competing against other prospective buyers for 
emerging technology and steering engineering talent and private capital toward the 
development of innovative defense solutions.  
Such disruptive technology comes with disproportionately powerful or even 
exponential potential to attack or defend against a stronger opponent or a more powerful 
conventional system. In this technological race, unconventional or asymmetric 
technology is also used to defend against other disruptive technology. Some of the 
growing areas include cyber, robotics, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and data 
analytics. We refer to these kinds of technologies in this research effort.  
B. MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
The market dynamics behind innovation, its funding and return on investment 
influence industry behavior and interaction with the government. The extent of 
government R&D funding for a given product drives the level of government’s IP rights. 
Companies view IP rights as a zero-sum game of their market size opportunity and ability 
to charge monopolistic prices in those markets. 
The defense industrial base, while historically a source of major innovations, 
pursues new technology development in conjunction with sales of existing products. For 
the established defense companies, protecting incumbent market share is as important, or 
situationally even more important, than attempts at developing new products. The new 
technology comes with high development costs, and may ultimately replace products in 
the existing portfolio. Additionally, the new technology may generate lower profit 
margins than existing product lines. The goals of maximizing profit and developing new 
technology compete to some extent, and may even crowd each other out. That leaves less 
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than maximum incentive for traditional defense suppliers to leverage opportunities for 
new technology development. 
Further, as suppliers grow into mature companies, their organizational 
bureaucracy tends to hinder creativity and development. Therefore, the DOD needs 
continuous access to technology development companies as they emerge. New businesses 
in pursuit of emerging technology operate with fewer internal conflicts. They normally 
do not yet have a portfolio of products and cash cows to promote and defend in lieu of 
developing new products. Rather they aggressively pursue product creation to build a 
portfolio. They operate as relatively flat, agile, and focused organizations. In turn, they 
seek out similarly-organized buyers for fast and efficient sales to sustain their operations. 
“Flat, agile, and focused” does not closely describe the defense acquisition enterprise. 
The market environment changed for the DOD when emerging technology 
became cheaper and more accessible for adversaries, while, concurrently, the U.S. 
government’s share of R&D funding shrank, leaving the private sector to shoulder a 
growing part of the overall R&D efforts. At least in the near future, the shrinking defense 
budgets will further accelerate the shift from government-funded research to privately-
funded research, leaving the government with less leverage to acquire new technology 
after its privately funded development. This leaves the DOD in a less advantageous 
buying position, one that relies on privately developed technology and includes increased 
competition among buyers. In terms of vulnerability, the DOD’s—and indeed the U. S.—
reliance on technology exposes us to cyber-attacks and necessitates both offensive and 
defensive technological advantage. 
C. WARTIME RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY 
The DOD employs wartime rapid procurement authorization in times of large 
scale conflict. Defense acquisition shifts into a frenzy during conflict. The Pentagon 
outsources logistics and life support services to private companies and focuses on core 
missions. Once major operations wind down, so does the flexibility to mitigate some of 
the time-consuming steps in the traditional procurement process.  
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The Army’s rapid fielding office at program executive office (PEO) Soldier 
serves as an example of actual and perceived procurement challenges. In wartime, PEO 
Soldier utilizes rapid acquisition authority to expedite procurement. For existing 
commercial solutions, PEO Soldier taps into existing contract vehicles in the DOD and 
beyond (e.g., GSA vehicles) to acquire necessary products. The department has largely 
viewed procurement schedule as a trade-off against cost and quality, with schedule rising 
in importance during wartime and cost consciousness prevailing in peacetime.  
The Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program is another recent 
example of a rapid system acquisition during wartime. At the height of the Iraq war, 
Secretary Gates pulled the MRAP program out of the traditional acquisition path and into 
a direct report program to him to expedite development and production. With improvised 
explosive devices killing the highest number of troops in war zone, every day of 
acquisition, production and fielding schedule mattered in the effort to avoid at least some 
of the daily casualties. That pressure created a staggering schedule premium to field the 
vehicles to the ground forces. Each day of lead time was of personal interest to Secretary 
Gates.  
D. RESULTS 
Our research of DIUx and acquisition policies yielded some authorized avenues to 
deviate from traditional contracting to expedite procurement and to adapt to private 
procurement methods. However, non-traditional contracting methods then triggered 
questions of level of awareness and acceptability of such tools among contracting offices. 
Even the authority to exercise non-traditional tools such as other transactions is limited 
among government agencies. To learn answers to these questions, we spoke to 
acquisition staff in the field. In addition to reviewing statutes, regulations, and policies, 
we conducted a series of interviews with various defense organizations engaged in rapid 
procurement.  
The feedback varied based on the organization, mission, size, and type of items 
procured. We observed that as an organization grew in size, its contracting flexibility 
diminished. Understandably, as the procured products shifted from R&D items to 
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commercial items, contracting options narrowed accordingly. On the research and 
innovation-heavy end of the scale lies DARPA, whose mission is centered on developing 
solutions. Its small size and inherent agility allow for unconventional contracting 
methods. In fact, DARPA not only pioneered technological development within the DOD 
and broader government, DARPA led the advocacy for DOD policy and legislative action 
for securing the authority to conduct other transactions. 
1. Awareness of Expedited Solicitation/Contracting Methods and 
Training of the Users 
If you are not in a typically innovative organization, chance are you have never 
heard of nor worked with expedited contracting methods. This lack of knowledge was 
echoed during our interviews by multiple individuals; “Not a lot of people know what 
OTAs are out there, or how to use them. It would be nice to know what tools are out there 
for the non-traditional contracting officer” (program manager [PM] at PEO Soldier and 
KO at SOCOM, personal communication, August 3, 2016). This lack of awareness of 
expedited solicitation and contracting methods is a central and common theme found 
across many organizations, whether they acquire innovative technology or not. Beyond 
internal government awareness, many non-traditional vendors are just as unaware of the 
steps taken to ease burdensome traditional contracting methods. In one interview, a PM 
noted that they solicited with a BAA to seek innovative solutions, but the vendors did not 
know it was even out there awaiting responses: “Success sometimes depends on training 
the vendors on how to conduct business with the government” (KO at SOCOM, personal 
communication, August 3, 2016). “It comes down to education and fear that someone is 
going to do something wrong; the legal guys won’t let us try it” (PM at PEO Soldier, 
personal communication, August 3, 2016). So, the need for awareness internally is 
matched with the need to get the word out to industry.   
“Defense Acquisition University doesn’t offer courses for this sort of contracting; 
we had to seek out training slides from faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School and 
DARPA to create a way forward, basically just trial and error” (KO at SOCOM, personal 
communication, August 3, 2016). SOCOM realizes the potential benefits of these 
expedited contracting methods and is establishing a special unit to spearhead their future 
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use. This unit is also tasked with educating the KOs, PMs, and requirement owners about 
the proper use of these methods (KO at SOCOM, personal communication, August 3, 
2016). “[The] Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) gave a presentation on using 
‘Other Transactions’ and a vendor demonstration forum for new technology companies to 
show attendees their new technology solutions” (KO at Gunter Annex, personal 
communication, August 6, 2016). 
2. Authority to Use  
The authority for using Other Transactions is codified in 10 U.S.C. 2371 and 10 
U.S.C. 2371b for prototypes. DARPA and NASA received initial authorizations, with 
other government agencies following suit. However, authorization for use is only the first 
step. It is indicative of the tool’s accessibility to a given agency, not the extent of use for 
that agency. Therefore, pursuit of authorization and subsequent application is indicative 
of a combination of the agency’s need for non-traditional acquisition (authorization) and 
its cultural environment that allows (or does not allow) the agency to successfully utilize 
the authorization (application). According to GAO (2016) compilation, Congress 
authorized other transactions for 11 executive agencies in various permanent, temporary 
or program-specific forms (p. 6). The agencies in turn vary on the extent of using OTs 
and types of OT activities. Figure 4 depicts the 11 agencies with congressional authority 
as of FY 2016 with types of OT activities by agency. 
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Figure 4.  Agency Use of Other Transaction Agreements for FY 2010 through 
FY 2014. Source: GAO (2016). 
3. Flexibility of Options 
In the operational community, SOCOM focuses on unconventional warfare 
missions. Unconventional warfare does not occur in vacuum. Operators using special 
tactics are best supported with unconventional contracting tools used to acquire 
customized solutions. SOCOM is small enough to avoid the bureaucracy that bogs down 
larger buying organizations, yet big enough to attract vendors. SOCOM employs other 
transactions and, more recently, technology investment agreements for development and 
prototyping. 
“As long as you are able to justify your reasoning and able to work within the 
rules and regulations you are using, it’s fine. [Furthermore,] you tell me I can write an 
agreement and don’t need the FAR, let’s do it” (KO at SOCOM, personal 
communication, August 3, 2016). DARPA, as an early advocate and regular user of other 
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transactions, also lauds the merits and benefits of the flexibility afforded in the 
authorization.  
An expert in ballistics at PEO Soldier, however, expressed skepticism with regard 
to other transactions. Given the magnitude of developing, procuring, and fielding 
equipment for the whole Army, a large-scale acquisition requires production of millions 
of items. Our research focused on the development of technology or capability and the 
acquisition of prototypes, limited items, or intangibles such as software. The interview 
audience discussed broader challenges across the acquisition cycle. Representatives at 
PEO Soldier consider the entire acquisition process when planning and streamlining 
efforts. The large scale of their procurements arose as a point of distinction from our 
other interviews. Other transactions apply to prototyping and development. They allow a 
degree of flexibility to make acquisitions in a wide range of research, development and 
technology maturation efforts. They do not afford mass procurement of developed 
products.  
Like most traditional procurement offices, PEO Soldier lacks the authority to 
exercise other transactions. Could the authority to issue other transactions be beneficial to 
organizations such as PEO Soldier? For an affirmative response to hold true, the buying 
agency must be hindered in acquisition of R&D or prototyping.  
Notably, the feedback from PEO Soldier indicated that for development and 
prototyping, BAAs and traditional contracting methods meets the needs of the 
organization. The challenge lies in shifting from technology development to force-wide 
mass procurement. That is where, despite the availability of technology and prototypes, 
the Army’s acquisition of service-wide equipment slows to a crawl. Procuring 
standardized gear for the force requires layers of approvals that can set the process back 
by many months, or even years. Congressional fiscal appropriations and political 
attempts to steer large-scale procurements also play a greater role as the procurement size 
grows. While the feedback on the benefits, use and applicability of other transactions 
varied among the respondents, the comparative ease of using them in smaller 
organizations became apparent during our interviews. 
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In PEO Soldier’s case, the ballistic protection program office met its objectives 
with developing an improved helmet without using other transactions. Their challenge lay 
in launching large scale production. Other transactions were of no benefit in later stages 
of the acquisition. This example shows the dynamics of a moving bottleneck in the 
process. While the acquisition needs to clear the initial hurdle of developing the 
necessary technology, large-scale procurements are likely to run into other hurdles as 
they progress toward becoming programs of record. 
Even in R&D efforts, PEO Soldier relied on the more traditional procurement 
methods with BAA solicitations. The ballistic program office found available traditional 
tools adequate for ballistic protection research, development, testing, and prototyping. 
They did not seek other transaction authority or expect enhanced access to product 
developers through non-traditional contracting tools. Given an opportunity, they would 
have pursued an OT-type tool for large-scale procurement, if there were such a vehicle. 
The market for ballistic defense procurements is small, comprised of relatively few 
companies and few, if any, prospective new entrants. PEO Soldier can adequately reach 
the ballistics R&D market with traditional tools.  
But the program office acknowledged that other transactions can help the DOD 
better reach other markets in emerging technology, cybersecurity, prototyping, or small 
scale acquisitions that will not translate to a program of record. DARPA, for instance, as 
an authority champion and avid user of other transactions, is heavily reliant on this 
authority for its market access. Contracting leadership estimated that DARPA awarded 
hundreds of other transactions since obtaining statutory authority. 
4. Support within the Government 
On the opposite end of the scale from DARPA and SOCOM lies large-scale 
fielding and equipping of standardized items for the U.S. Army. Procuring millions of 
rifles, pistols, or helmets requires the use of a traditional contracting process, with its 
series of reviews and approvals. Needless to say, the traditional contracting process is 
longer and more bureaucratic than non-traditional methods. 
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“Effectiveness of expedited acquisitions fall on the support from [Contracting 
Officer’s Representatives] and the PMs to make them happen effectively” (KO at 
SOCOM, personal communication, August 3, 2016). “Sometimes the commercial items 
do not meet all the user’s needs; we tell them that 70 percent is all we can get, and they 
say that 70 percent is better than zero percent” (PM at PEO Soldier, personal 
communication, August 3, 2016). Support for non-traditional tools within an agency 
depends on its mission, culture, and market access needs. When presented with a partial 
solution, the customer may simply elect to rely on readily available technology and 
product offerings to meet the immediate requirements. Proposals of existing products 
with partial solutions afford a faster acquisition, fielding and equipping process than 
prototypes or developmental products with a prospect of comprehensive solution but 
uncertainty in the areas of cost, schedule or performance. 
In the trade-off between accepting a quick partial solution or seeking a 
comprehensive solution, procuring offices are commonly inclined to compromise on a 
partial solution given immediate availability and greater price certainty. Acquisition 
community philosophy leans toward optimizing use and application based on existing 
solutions rather than optimizing solutions themselves. It is in this uncertain area of 
improving solutions that OTs offer greater reach at the market. 
For an agency to seek other transaction authority, its mission must fundamentally 
hinge on advancing research or technology acquisition beyond existing commercial or 
defense solutions. Much of our energy, even when constrained by procurement tools, is 
focused on how to best or most closely meet acquisition objectives with existing tools, 
rather than pushing procurement tools boundaries. The perception of risk mitigation 
provided by conservative procurement methods serves as a deterrent from deviating 
outside these predictably safe and established methods.   
5. Intellectual Property Rights: Collection vs. Protection 
While the private sector is taking the lead in innovation, the government trails 
behind in adapting an intellectual property (IP) strategy for this new privately-funded 
order of conducting research efforts. IP and data rights terms and conditions vary based 
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on funding sources and parties’ rights in using technology beyond a given acquisition. 
Industry conducts comparisons of opportunity costs, profit margins, risk levels and 
expected outcomes as standard business procedures. For those companies, the trade-off is 
between government revenues and other potential commercial revenues (profits) 
foregone at the expense of giving up property rights. The DOD carries the burden of 
avoiding even the perception of unprofitable IP dilution to establish its attractiveness as a 
buyer. Historic reliance on a traditional industrial base that is well-versed in defense 
acquisitions, internal development, and government-funded research made the DOD 
accustomed to retaining a high level of data rights. Such expectations are incompatible 
with venture capital-funded research and technology development efforts. And while 
domestic firms recognize the need for the DOD to maintain technological advantage, they 
must also maximize their market opportunities and potential for returns on investment.  
“We don’t go after the data rights; we buy the product as is” (PM at PEO Soldier, 
personal communication, August 3, 2016). 
According to DARPA contracts leadership, the agency historically dealt with 
many Silicon Valley companies of all sizes with a notable exception of the two largest 
companies—Google and Apple. While other technology companies do business with 
DARPA, concerns over IP permeate the entire process and interaction. As a matter of 
competition and growth strategy, large companies, in both defense and technology 
industries, monitor the market for new technology development at smaller firms. That 
technology, or the entire firm, then become a prime acquisition target to leverage new 
technology as stand-alone item or incorporate it into other systems with commercial or 
defense applications.  
In discussing the rights to IP, we have identified a vast gap in perceived, or 
perhaps real, interpretation of the IP rights spectrum. DARPA contracting leadership 
described vendors’ perception as driven by paranoia and distrust of the government. 
DIUx contracting leadership offers a cooperative approach to negotiating data rights, 
leaving all options on the table as a matter of attracting the widest pool of vendors and 
alleviating their concerns.  
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Justifiably, proprietary technology is the lifeblood of technology companies. So 
they want a lot of flexibility with retaining control over trade secrets and patent rights. 
DARPA considers its future needs in determining the extent of government IP rights to 
pursue. The dilemma the government and vendors run into is that, while vendors 
welcome government funding and the government is willing to fund promising 
development, vendors claim the need for both government and commercial markets to 
recoup their investment. One avenue DARPA considers is giving the job to a company, 
but delaying government claim to data rights. Part of market research and negotiation is 
having a good business sense to figure out what return on investment vendors need.  
DARPA conducted hundreds of other transactions over the years, including some 
with companies in Silicon Valley. And it continues to seek smaller companies for future 
transactions. The hardest part is reaching them. The ballistic protection office at PEO 
Soldier offered an economic perspective on the attractiveness of the government market, 
including data rights: “[The government needs] to make sure the companies make money 
for them to be interested.” And if the government wants a company to develop a 
government-specific product, they may decline if the market is too small. 
It’s really challenging. So for body armor protection and helmets, it’s a 
very small market compared to smartphones, automobiles, or aerospace. 
It’s a very small market for [force] protection. That’s why a lot of people 
and businesses are not interested. We don’t have large companies working 
in this area, only small companies. It’s not something you can help. Large 
companies look at that market and say: “No, we are not interested. Every 
month, the maximum is only a couple of million dollars in sales. We don’t 
need that.” (PM at PEO Soldier, personal communication, August 11, 
2016) 
When the government buys small lots, it does not appeal to the wider market, 
“But if you are talking about new small companies, then they should be interested. I don’t 
think the government is pushing any new company away.” The reservations are on the 
company’s side—they are “not interested.” The ballistic protection office even expressed 
skepticism of market capability: 
We have all these companies coming in. Most of these companies think 
they have something better—they don’t. It’s the reverse—it’s not that they 
have something better that we don’t want to use. They don’t always 
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understand what we really want. Everybody thinks they have something 
better than the military. They come here to this office, we tell them the 
performance requirement, and ask: Can you make it? The answer is 
typically: “No.” (PM at PEO Soldier, personal communication, August 11, 
2016) 
For the relatively few companies that develop, or are capable of producing 
innovative technology, they may have the option to offer it to the wider market, including 
foreign governments and commercial markets. In such a competitive environment, the 
DOD needs to act as a competitive buyer. But this is a difficult feat. The ballistic 
protection office noted 
It’s similar to trying to hire someone smart. You have to pay them more 
than other organizations to hire them and to retain them. If you tell a 
company with new technology that everyone wants: “Make this only for 
the military,” there is no way—unless you’re willing to pay much more. 
You look at their prospective target market coverage and size. Can you 
pay them [enough in profit to substitute other market opportunities]? You 
can’t. It’s taxpayers’ money. So it’s money driven. (PM at PEO Soldier, 
personal communication, August 11, 2016) 
E. DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL 
As overseas conflicts, or the scale of U.S. participation in overseas conflicts, 
declines, the conflict-driven or life-saving urgency for rapid acquisition also diminishes. 
Extraordinary or temporary rapid acquisition authorities expire due to lack of 
justification, absence of request, and/or lack of congressional support to bend traditional 
processes during peacetime. Dr. Carter returned to the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense 
in 2015 when the DOD was still at war on multiple fronts, but on a smaller scale than in 
previous years. Secretary Carter realized that technology advancement and application 
was an item of immediate importance. He displayed the commitment to acquiring the 
latest technology for defense purposes with regular visits to Silicon Valley. In 2015, 
Secretary Carter announced the formation of Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 
(DIUx), with a mission to serve as a bridge between the U.S. military and companies 
operating at the cutting edge of technology (“Work with Us,” n.d.). 
Military services and other government agencies previously reached out to the 
engineering community in Silicon Valley for innovative solutions. Secretary Carter made 
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a more deliberate and organized call to the technology development community by 
locating DIUx in the heart of Silicon Valley, just outside Moffett Federal Airfield in 
Mountain View, CA. DIUx started with a promising outreach mission to the technology 
community in Silicon Valley and expected strong interest and collaboration from the 
military community. 
The success of the DIUx venture rests on, among other things, contracting 
flexibility and full utilization of expedited procurement methods. Any shortcomings in 
this combination can doom defense procurement of emerging technology and engineering 
talent. Unlike generic, commercial, off-the-shelf items, emerging technology has no 
substitutes. And unlike non-commercial defense-specific items, engineering talent behind 
emerging technology enjoys high demand from private industry buyers—the DOD’s 
competition in technology acquisition. In this niche sector of emerging technology, the 
DOD simply cannot employ its traditional and burdensome procurement process. In the 
area of emerging technology, the DOD risks losing opportunities to procure emerging 
technology altogether, thus jeopardizing its ability to maintain the technological 
advantage required to support the national defense strategy. 
Importantly, DIUx opened its office without organic contracting capability. 
Instead, DIUx planned for contract execution through the respective customer 
organizations and requiring activities within DOD. Initially, DIUx relied on the Army’s 
System of Systems Security (SOSSEC) Consortium established by the Army Contracting 
Command, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (ACC-NJ). The SOSSEC vehicle allows for OT 
awards. 
Over time, DIUx concluded that organic, non-traditional procurement capability 
is necessary for its operations. Given the slow government hiring process and time-
consuming training required for government procurement proficiency, a government 
internal transfer seemed the most reliable staffing solution. But even an internal transfer 
can take months, or even a year, to accomplish, assuming availability of qualified people 
willing to move to DIUx. Non-traditional defense contract writing capability, most 
notably OTA expertise, resides with ACC-NJ. To quickly enable DIUx to make 
purchases, they needed an immediate on-boarding of skilled OTA contracting officers. In 
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the summer of 2016, DIUx sponsored ACC-NJ contracting officers for a temporary 
assignment at its Silicon Valley office in conjunction with CSO call for industry 
submissions. DIUx intends to hire internal OTA contracting staff in the future. 
While Silicon Valley is the leading technology innovation area in the country and 
the world, it is not the only technology hub. To cast a wider net, DIUx plans to expand to 
other technology hubs in Boston, Seattle, and Austin. Secretary Carter elevated DIUx 
profile and expectations by reorganizing it into a direct report organization—just as 
Secretary Gates did with the MRAP program years ago. As a new organization staffed 
with authorizations borrowed from military department headquarters, DIUx experienced 
a shortage of corporate expertise in leveraging existing non-traditional procurement 
methods. As DIUx grows in staff and experience, it may encounter other constraints 
similar to the more established rapid acquisition offices (i.e., DARPA and SOCOM). 
The DIUx model relies on expedited contracting methods to partner with non-
traditional suppliers. Flexibility and expert-level use of expedited procurement methods 
are key to the unit’s success. DIUx has been evolving since its inception, improving its 
strategy, outreach, and effectiveness, to enhance the DOD’s buying position in the 
competitive emerging technology market. 
F. SUMMARY  
This research collated feedback from various defense agencies with policy 
analysis of existing traditional and non-traditional procurement tools. The feedback from 
the acquisition community revealed that we need to view the market strategically, from 
the lenses of profitability, market size, and market limitations related to IP rights. We 
started this research with a basic premise of using the full arsenal of procurement tools to 
the DOD’s advantage in the competitive market for new technology. Our research has 
shown that non-traditional tools such as other transactions afford wide flexibility, 
however no tool can meet all scenarios. Indeed, identifying the most appropriate tool 
requires an analysis of the stage and scale of the requirement. Available procurement 
authorities and flexibilities vested within the buying agency may further restrict 
applicable options. 
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V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The government’s current buying power still appears strong in the market; 
however, capitalizing on it requires educating both industry and defense acquisition 
community on the expedited contracting methods. We recommend increasing awareness 
of and training on these expedited contracting the methods, seeking out tactical authority 
at the DOD level, allowing more flexibility with the government, educating acquisition 
partners to gain support, and finally, pursuing the minimal necessary intellectual property 
rights for emerging technologies. 
B. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
The underlying conclusion of our research is that the government needs to think 
strategically and empathetically in acquisition of emerging technology. The DOD is 
inclined to expect that the marketplace has what it needs, or is at least willing to develop 
it. Taking a step back requires considering how businesses and market segments view the 
government as a buying organization. The government’s purchasing role and magnitude 
varies by vendor and market segment. Some vendors rely predominantly or almost 
entirely on government sales. For those vendors, absent new markets, their continued 
existence critically depends on continued government orders. For other vendors, 
government sales may represent only a negligible share of revenue. Low portion of 
government sales offers those vendors a wider discretion in future pursuits of government 
sales. The government tends to impose regulations, clauses, and its own methodology on 
the market with limited regard for administrative burdens to vendors and the impact on 
government’s competitiveness as a buyer. Some of the government’s methods deter firms 
from actively pursuing government contracts, or may even cause them to avoid 
government contracts altogether. 
These market realities raise the question of how to entice technology companies 
to pursue government sales and develop products for government and dual use. The long-
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term government acquisition strategy for emerging technology should aim to shift the 
market dynamics toward an environment where innovative firms view the government as 
a favorably buyer and create products with the government as the intended customer. 
Ideally, even business creation and venture funding should include prospective 
government sales as part of technology companies’ business plans from inception. 
When choosing markets to pursue and products to develop, companies consider 
market size, potential, profit margins, development costs, and competition. Similarly, the 
government needs to consider its size as a buyer for a given product and how it affects 
the supplier’s sales portfolio. Strategically, the DOD, and particularly DIUx, is trying to 
become a competitive and cost-effective buyer in the marketplace, especially in crowded 
and critical market segments like emerging technology. Competing buyers—private firms 
and foreign buyers—also carry advantages and disadvantages.  
To better understand the participants and dynamics of this market, we gathered 
characteristic elements of the government (Figure 5), other competing buyers (Figure 6) 
and technology firms offering emerging technology (Figure 7). Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis allows for scrutiny of a market participant 
or homogenous groups of participants. The series of SWOT analyses then allows for 
strategic comparison of market participants. In the government category, our focus lies 
with the DOD. For competing buyers, we considered the strongest prospects. Due to 
limited sources and offerings of emerging technology, only the most competitive and 
attractive buyers will acquire the technology. For developers of emerging technology, we 
narrowed the analysis to the relatively few promising and successful firms in a wide 
R&D market where success is elusive. Those limited sources of emerging technology, 
similar to the strongest buyers, enjoy bargaining power and leverage well above industry 
average. The comparison of the DOD’s analysis against other buyers reveals some 
commonality and deep differences in philosophy. After accounting for technology firms’ 
motivations and pursuits, the DOD needs a strategy to leverage its strengths and 
opportunities to meet companies’ objectives better than competing buyers. Such strategy 
demands much more than inward-looking plans for incremental streamlining of the 
defense acquisition process. 
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Figure 5.  SWOT Analysis: Government Acquisition in the Emerging 
Technology Market 
 




Figure 7.  SWOT Analysis: Developers of Emerging Technology 
This basic analysis shows that a buyer’s success depends on leveraging relative 
strengths and mitigating relative weaknesses to prevail in the market. The SWOT 
elements involve organizational culture, financial standing, risk tolerance and mission 
objectives. Procurement method is only one of the acquisition policy tools in this 
endeavor, although it is most direct and immediate in interacting with the industry. It acts 
as a vehicle of exchange with vendors conveying everything from financial consideration 
to organizational priorities. 
C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Government agencies like DARPA and SOCOM have been successfully 
executing expedited contracting methods for research and prototypes for decades. As 
discussed in Chapter IV, there are five improvement areas that will enable government 
agencies to meet their emerging technology needs. We conclude that the following 
initiatives will aide in effective application of expedited contracting methods to further 
attract non-traditional vendors in collaborating with the government. 
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1. Awareness of Expedited Solicitation/Contracting Methods and 
Training of the Users 
If you were to ask junior contracting officers/administrators how they can quickly 
acquire R&D, prototypes, or other technologies without using the FAR, you would likely 
get a blank stare. Prior to conducting our own research on the topic, neither one of us 
ever worked on, or had knowledge of expedited contracting procedures. To that point, if 
you have never worked for DARPA, SOCOM, or another cutting edge technology user, 
chances are that you have never heard of expedited contracting procedures, either. Our 
research suggests the government could greatly benefit from awareness training, or 
formal training, on these much quicker methods of contracting. We recommend that the 
DAU create a web-based training for the multiple types of expedited contracting methods 
available to the user. We also recommend that such a course be a requirement for 
achieving Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) Level III certification. 
The partnership that DIUx and the broader government seeks with the emerging 
technology engineering community requires informed parties, well-versed in expedited 
methods. 
2. Authority to Use  
 Currently, only certain agencies have the authority (granted by Congress) to 
execute OTAs (see Chapter IV, Table 1). This authority provides the latitude to work 
outside of the FAR’s more traditional contracting methods. We recommend delegating 
congressional authority for OTAs to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research & 
Engineering) to determine which DOD agencies may execute OTAs. In the absence of 
relevant authority to use OTAs, or other non-traditional methods, procurement offices 
operate within the constraints of traditional methods. Those traditional methods may then 
entice a limited pool of vendors with existing but partial solutions and exclude the more 
innovative vendors with prototypes or developmental solutions. In this predicament, 
procurement offices default to navigating the limited avenues of traditional contracting 
rather than widening the available path to success. The advocacy for using non-traditional 
methods should come from executive levels. Training, awareness, and cultural 
acceptance of non-traditional tools hinge on existing authority to execute them. 
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3. Flexibility of Options 
In the Air Force, it has long been said that flexibility is the key to airpower. While 
we are not focused on actual airpower in this research, flexibility is key to successful 
contracting for emerging technology. While many contracting officers will argue that 
they can only work within the confines of the FAR, the FAR itself conveys that 
the role of each member of the Acquisition Team is to exercise personal 
initiative and sound business judgment in providing the best value product 
or service to meet the customer’s needs [and] Government members of the 
Acquisition Team may assume if a specific strategy, practice, policy or 
procedure is in the best interests of the Government and is not addressed 
in the FAR, nor prohibited by law (statute or case law), Executive order or 
other regulation, that the strategy, practice, policy or procedure is a 
permissible exercise of authority. (FAR 1.102(d), 2016) 
The FAR provides the flexibility for the contracting community to step out of 
comfort zones, where appropriate. We recommend that no policy or other restrictive 
directives be produced to limit this flexibility, particularly in acquiring emerging 
technologies. 
4. Support within the Government 
Support for the expedited procurement processes and methods, such as other 
transactions, is needed by all facets of the execution chain, from Congress to Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), all the way down to the contracting officers, CORs and PMs. 
Lacking direct guidance and public law direction, knowledge of how we apply the 
expedited contracting solutions is key to gaining organizational support. We recommend 
training for acquisition professionals and partners, including JAG, financial managers, 
PMs, and system engineers so they can better understand the process of the expedited 
contracting methods.  
5. Intellectual Property Rights: Collection vs. Protection 
In an effort to attract and gain the support of non-traditional vendors, it is 
extremely important that the government only negotiate for the IP rights it absolutely 
needs to execute its missions. As the IP strategy guidance directs, “Don’t make an 
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unnecessary ‘grab’ for deliverables or additional license rights for proprietary IP” (DOD 
Open Systems Architecture, 2014, p. 3). We recommend agencies reduce their need for 
proprietary IP rights and seek only what is needed to satisfy mission requirements. 
6. R&D Funding Sources and IP Implications 
While the overall R&D spending in the U.S. continues to grow (see Figure 8), 
federal R&D spending has been decreasing after it peaked in 2010 (“Historical Trends,” 
2016). Since then, federal R&D spending, as both a constant-dollar amount and share of 
overall funding, has been on a steady decline. Industry and other funding sources have 
more than offset the decrease in federal spending, leading to the overall R&D spending 
increase.  
 
Figure 8.  Cumulative R&D Expenditures by Funder. 
Source: “Historical Trends” (2016). 
This funding reliance shift from federal to other R&D funding sources goes back 
several decades. As part of a long-term trend, other R&D funding sources outpaced 
federal R&D spending back in the 1970s (see Figure 9). Strong growth in industry and 
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other R&D spending compared to relatively flat federal funding now leaves federal R&D 
funding share at less than a quarter of the overall R&D funding—a far cry from the 1960s 
when federal R&D spending share peaked at about two thirds of the overall R&D funding 
(“Historical Trends,” 2016). 
 
Figure 9.  Allocation Ratio of R&D Expenditures by Funder. 
Source: “Historical Trends” (2016). 
This is no indication that this trend of decreasing federal share of R&D spending 
will change. Nor is it intrinsically disadvantageous to the U.S. economy and government. 
However, this phenomenon does call for an adaptation in technology acquisition. Private 
funders need to deliver attractive returns to investors both as part of the arrangement for 
existing funding and to encourage future investment. R&D in the U.S. has become 
predominantly dependent on private funding. The government has neither the inclination 
nor the means to replace private R&D funding dominance. Private R&D funding 
certainly offers the government an advantage of having sources other than appropriated 
budget to fund domestic R&D. It affords the government more flexibility in how much to 
fund R&D and where to target efforts that may be underfunded through private sources.  
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With federal sources taking a secondary role in overall R&D funding, the defense 
acquisition posture needs to acknowledge commercial lead and dominance. Post-
development, the contractual relationship with regard to IP between vendors and the 
government rests with terms, conditions, and IP clauses. The government philosophy on 
IP policy and clauses lags behind, and is essentially from the era when the government 
dominated R&D funding and was entitled to respectively higher levels of IP rights. And 
while the government continues to heavily fund defense-specific R&D, this sector is 
shrinking to a niche segment compared to the growing technology market. Thus, legacy 
IP policy serves as a poor policy for the current state of privately-funded emerging 
technology.  
The U.S. government’s buying share in the defense market is largely inverse to its 
share in the technology market. Since U.S. defense spending far exceeds other countries’ 
budgets, or even combinations of budgets, the DOD retains enough leverage to both 
attract traditional defense suppliers and also to limit authorization to sell equipment, 
systems and sensitive technologies to other countries. In emerging technology, the DOD 
lacks comparable market buyer dominance. Notwithstanding the administrative burdens 
of the traditional defense acquisition processes, other buying segments offer more 
lucrative opportunities to technology vendors. In this environment, attempting to exclude 
other markets with an us-or-them attitude is a losing proposition for the government. An 
effective way to entice technology sector cooperation is not by excluding their other 
lucrative markets, but by expanding them. Adding government purchases to vendors’ 
prospective and target markets favorably grows market opportunity and interest for 
vendors. This, however, requires the government to adapt to the industry’s products, 
processes, and legal terms. The government may still need product modification to meet 
its needs, however these modifications should be limited, and only undertaken when the 
additional value outweighs the additional costs.  
The acquisition process—traditional for industry and non-traditional for the 
DOD—is a non-price government lever to enhance itself as a favorable buyer. The legal 
terms should still deliver sufficient security and performance assurance to the 
government, without unduly hindering vendors’ market opportunities. The security and 
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protection policies, while well-intended, relevant, and necessary, do not alone account for 
the economic reality of market sizes and profit margins. In a profit-maximizing 
environment, restrictive IP policy excludes buying opportunities for the U.S. government, 
rather than other buyers. Recent Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives attempt to 
reconcile with this reality by encouraging flexibility in IP terms. However, the 
government needs to distinguish among its varying strategic positions in different 
markets and adapt its IP pursuits accordingly. While the government can successfully 
impose a restrictive IP policy with tank purchases where it acts as the sole buyer, such 
policy will only alienate it from the emerging technology market. 
The best bet for the government is to incentivize companies to enter defense 
products market and pursue government solutions by growing their markets with dual 
commercial and military applications. The dual market should be not an afterthought 
once technology has already been developed; it should be a mindset and methodology 
from the formation of businesses and the inception of technologies.  
BBP does not alter the regulatory guidance, but influences government 
acquisition philosophy, i.e., with the expanded use of incentive contracts. Similarly, BBP 
has the potential to encourage the DOD to exercise the flexibility within existing IP 
policy to better attract technology companies. Previous iterations of BBP encouraged 
increased use of prototyping and experimentation, modular open systems architecture, 
and other transactions. BBP has so far provided reference material on intellectual 
property terms and directed internal review and assessment of trends. The next step is to 
raise awareness and encourage the requiring and procuring organizations to seek lower 
levels of IP rights when purchasing technology funded primarily, or entirely, at private 
expense with prospective commercial application and competing buyers in the wider 
market. 
D. SUMMARY 
Acquisition organizations in the DOD and the broader government typically 
operate on the premise that they can unilaterally set the terms of market exchange with 
the assumption of the market’s willingness to abide by such rules, the market’s ability to 
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provide the required products, and market’s willingness to actually attempt to provide the 
products to the government instead of pursuing other opportunities. The government 
continuously attempts acquisition reform and modernization initiatives. While those 
attempts are well-intended, they often have fallen short of the stated goals and policy 
objectives. Furthermore, acquisition reform initiatives typically offer a limited inward-
looking scope for government agencies. Such efforts to, for example, shorten the 
procurement administrative lead time (PALT), consider government goals and 
preferences. They seldom compare PALT with market standards and how fast 
government procurement needs to be accelerated to become competitive with the broader 
market.  
With regard to competition, the government is understandably focused on 
competition among its suppliers. The deeper question is how to broaden the existence of 
suppliers in the products of government interest and how to raise the government’s 
market participation among the businesses in those respective segments. Competition 
works both ways. The government focuses on competition among suppliers with little 
consideration for its competing buyers. Competing buyers vary by products, services, 
location, and time; creating a dynamic environment. Besides buyers outside the 
government, the government also falls into the trap of competition among various 
government agencies and procurement offices for limited products and suppliers. 
Contracting methods offer useful tools in navigating toward procurement and 
policy objectives. But contracting methods are only one set of tools in the broader 
acquisition environment. Flexible contracting tools have the potential to attract additional 
suppliers and broader market segments than afforded through traditional methods alone. 
Having a broad, market-wide acquisition reform strategy affords the government a better 
chance not only of conducting procurement as intended, but also of having access to 
more products, suppliers, and market segments. 
Regulations, policies, and procedures may offer a degree of assurance in the 
procurement process and public policy implementation. But they also come at a cost. The 
costs come in the form of higher costs to suppliers that pass along the costs back to the 
buyers (i.e., the government) in the form of higher prices. Higher cost to enter and 
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conduct business results in fewer suppliers, a less competitive segment, higher profit 
margins to fewer suppliers, and higher prices to the government. New and small 
businesses are especially sensitive to costs of entry and administrative compliance 
overhead. For most businesses, establishing business systems comparable to those at the 
largest defense contractors is not an option. While patents, data rights, capital intensity, 
and other outside factors limit new entrants and competition, the government further 
limits the supplier pool with administrative burdens already established at existing 
suppliers but prohibitively costly and inconvenient to prospective suppliers. Meanwhile, 
the benefits of administrative burdens are uncertain. Thus, the traditional approach carries 
the risk of levying administrative costs without adequate accompanying benefits. 
The existing non-traditional methods afford government buyers wide flexibility in 
procurement. The challenge lies in matching available tools with relevant requirements. 
Culturally, the acquisition community needs to embrace the available tools as 
opportunities, while being selective with procurement methods and adaptive to the 
market environment. No single procurement method, or IP approach, efficiently captures 
all acquisition scenarios. Just as procuring offices attempt to apply a relevant contract 
type to a specific procurement, we also need match the procurement with applicable 
method and IP strategy. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This research project highlighted the need for the U.S. government to acquire 
emerging technology to retain its dominance over adversaries. We emphasized how 
lengthy and burdensome processes associated with traditional contracting methods inhibit 
the government from being a “good” or “sought after” customer in the eyes of emerging 
technology vendors. Further, we discussed how available expedited methods could 
improve this relationship, but only when we have the authority to use them. New 
questions arose during the course of this research that we believe future studies should 
address: 
1. Do technology firms still perceive that government contracting is too 
burdensome? If so, in what ways? 
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2. Should DAU include expedited contracting procedures as part of APDP 
Level III certification? If so, how? 
3. Should the FAR include expedited contracting procedures in FAR 16, or 
would their inclusion cause unnecessary regulation to an inherently 
flexible system of contracting? 
4. How can we incentivize established defense industrial companies to 
become more innovative? 
5. Could expedited contracting methods replace traditional methods for 
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APPENDIX A.  COMPARISON OF EXPEDITED METHODS 
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Source: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (2014). 
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APPENDIX B.  SAMPLE VENDOR LOAN AGREEMENT 
1. It is known that acceptance for test, loan, or evaluation for potential use by the 
Government does not make a promise to pay, a recognition of novelty, originality, 
uniqueness, or a contractual relationship which would make the Government 
liable to pay for any use of information to which it would otherwise be entitled. 
The Government has no plan of using any article or disclosure in which the 
submitter has set up property rights, without compensation. 
 
2. The Government will use care in the handling and testing of submissions. The 
Government will not take responsibility of liability to submitters or others for: 
a. Damage to, destruction, or loss of submissions resulting from testing or 
otherwise. 
b. Damage or injuries due to negligence or otherwise, which are incurred 
or suffered by submitters, submitter’s employees, or invitees during any 
test of such article or disclosure which is under the control of the 
submitter, submitter’s agents or employees. 
 
3. The submitter agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Government, its agents, 
and employees from any and all claims or causes of action whatsoever as may be 
incident to or come from the Government’s acceptance of and its part in the test 
and evaluation of any article covered by this agreement. 
 
4. The manufacture, transportation, and maintenance of articles submitted to the 
Government for demonstration or testing will be done at no cost to the 
Government. 
 
5. The submitter of any articles for evaluation will give instructions to the 
Government for disposal of such articles prior to completion of the test or 
evaluation. The disposal shall be at the cost of the submitter. 
 
6. The testing or evaluation of such articles will in no way cause the Government to 
acquire the articles submitted. 
 
7. The articles submitted will be handled according to Government rules for 
safeguarding such articles from unauthorized disclosure. The submitter agrees that 
any liability of unauthorized disclosure by the Government will not go past the 
actual loss of the submitter caused by acts of the Government. 
 
8. The acceptance of articles for demonstration, testing, or evaluation is not to be 
construed in any way as an acceptance or offer to accept such articles for 
Government use or as any promise implied that any contract to buy is to follow 
from the demonstration, test, or evaluation. 
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9. The terms of this Agreement shall be for the articles listed below, and also for all 
articles submitted hereafter until this agreement expires or is terminated in 
writing: 
 
Please list MAKE, MODEL, and SERIAL NUMBER for each component… 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The time of this Agreement shall be from ____________ to ____________ unless 
sooner terminated by either party.  ____________________ may remove this 
equipment at any time after giving prior notice to the Contracting Officer so 
coordinated action can be taken for timely removal. In case of changed operation 
conditions, the Government may ask ___________________ to remove the 
equipment prior to expiration of the Agreement. 
 
I,__________________________, certify that I have read this Agreement and will adhere 
to its terms and conditions. I further certify that I am ( ) sole owner of all articles and 
disclosure submitted for demonstration, testing, or evaluation; ( ) a membership of the 
partnership or association known as ________________________________ and have 














(Signature/Date of Contracting Officer) 
 
Source: Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2011, August 30) 
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APPENDIX C.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Questions are adapted from Senator Carper’s letter to Office of Management and Budget 
(Carper, 2016). 
 
1. What is the organization’s process or flow chart with schedule estimates 
for rapid acquisitions (if available)? Does the organization apply any 
method to measure or evaluate success in using the current process(es) for 
rapid acquisition?  
2. What techniques is the organization using to acquire innovative 
technology solutions developed by start-ups and other companies that 
have not traditionally done business with the government? What 
percentage of purchases come from businesses making first sale to the 
government? 
3. What is the organization doing to ensure that contracting officers are 
knowledgeable and comfortable with the relevant use of acquisition tools 
we discussed, as well as any other ways of rapidly acquiring emerging 
technology? 
4. What other methods are available to acquire new technology in a rapid 
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